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Abstract. This paper explores current printer identification techniques which allow the
origins of a printed document to be established. The printer used to create a particular
document can be traced by using unique and hidden information contained within that
document. Printer identification can ultimately lead to the printer’s owner(s) which
provides a valuable tool to government agencies during criminal investigations involving
forged documents or associated correspondence. Two groups of printer identification
technique are examined. Passive techniques utilise microscopic flaws in a document’s
print for printer matching while active techniques explicitly embed traceable data into a
document. Evidence has emerged to suggest that embedding tracking data into printed
documents has been employed since the 1980s. No legal precedents need be followed to
obtain and use hidden tracking data nor does the public have to be informed of this
practice.  Related privacy concerns are discussed brought about by the potential to
compromise the anonymity of every single printed document.
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With an ever decreasing cost of high quality printers, the printed ‘document’ has become
commonplace. A ‘document’ is considered to be a piece of printed matter that provides information,
such as passports, driving licences and banknotes. Today, printed documents are frequently associated
with many criminal and terrorist acts, be it counterfeiting, forgery or copyright infringements. With the 
continuing improvements in printer and scanner technology, these individuals are able to produce very
high quality fake documents, which are increasingly harder to detect when compared to those created
using more traditional forgery techniques. Criminals can now digitally scan currency and print
counterfeit money, or use similar techniques to produce forged ID cards, airline boarding passes and 
official documents, for example.
A valuable tool to government agencies is the ability to verify a document’s authenticity and trace 
those responsible for producing exposed fakes. One way of verifying a ‘true’ document is to link its
production with a known and authorised printer. Providing such a mechanism would uncover forged or
altered documents and potentially provide evidence that a suspect printer held as part of a criminal
investigation produced those documents. The printing of genuine documents could be done in a secure
and confident manner with the knowledge that any attempts to forge or copy those documents will be
detected. Such a link between document and printer however, means not only establishing which type
and model of printer was used but also which specific printer was used. Authorities must be capable of 
differentiating between documents printed on two different printers of the same model.
Tracing a printer’s whereabouts from the criminally connected documents it creates (e.g. forgeries or
printed correspondence) could potentially lead to the criminals themselves. Once the offending printer
is identified, its location and that of its owner may be done via the printer’s retailer, providing they
retain sales records, or from the owners themselves if they provide their printer’s manufacturer with
registration and warranty information.
The area of printer identification is an active research problem being carried out at a number of
institutes, notably Delp et al at Purdue University in the US [1]. From this research, two printer
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identification techniques have been suggested to address the issues previously mentioned: ‘passive’ and
‘active’. Passive techniques analyze a document’s unique characteristics and match them to those of a 
known printer, so providing the required link. Active techniques explicitly embed hidden printer
specific information into a document to enable printer traceability.
Unbeknownst to millions of printer users, an active printer identification scheme has been employed by
the US and other governments since the late 1980s. This scheme, carried out in conjunction with the 
majority of printer manufacturers has been used to trace printers used in criminal activities.  Having 
recently been uncovered by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) [2], the addition of ‘secret codes’
to documents created by both criminals and innocent users has raised many human rights and privacy
concerns.
This paper discusses current printer identification research and techniques (both passive and active)
including the covert scheme already used notably in the US, followed by privacy issues, potential
drawbacks and concluding remarks.
2. Identification techniques 
A need has been identified for government agencies to be able to authenticate and/or trace the origins 
of printed documents. Documents can be deemed genuine by certifying their creation is from a known
and authorised printer, while tracing the origins of fake or copied documents may potentially lead to
criminal groups. Traditional methods of authenticating and tracing documents, for example, special 
ink, holograms and threads in banknotes are limited due to expense and the need for specialist
equipment. A more accessible way of ascertaining the origin of a document is to identify the specific
printer used to create it. A number of techniques have/are being developed using passive and active
techniques.
!
2.1 Passive techniques
Passive techniques analyze a document’s unique characteristics and match it to those of a known
printer. This technique can be used to authenticate a genuine document or match a document with a
suspect printer, held as part of a criminal investigation. These unique characteristics come from the fact 
that no two printers are or behave the same. When manufactured, every printer will inherit unique
imperfections and characteristics from the components used
to construct it. These mechanical parts used to build printers,
including printers of the same model are not 100% the same
and would be far too expensive to be so. Therefore, printers
produce documents with specific defects, which can be
analyzed and used to tie those documents with their printers.
Delp et al describe a number of passive techniques to identify
laser or “electro-photographic” (EP) printers from printed
documents [6]. In [4], the print quality defect called
‘banding’, which produces horizontal imperfections in the
document, is utilised for this purpose. Banding occurs in
printers whose print mechanism includes a rotating drum
coated with a charged material that releases its charge when
exposed to light. A laser moves along the drum selectively
removing the charge in certain areas, which in turn attracts 
print toner to form letters or image features. The toner is then
transferred onto the paper to form the document. The speed at
which printer drums rotate is variable so any slow down
causes darker print, while speeding up causes lighter print.
This results in alternate horizontal bands of dark and light
print as seen in the bottom image of figure 1. The frequency
Figure 1: The effects of banding
(bottom picture) 
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of these bands can be analysed using mathematical techniques to obtain an intrinsic signature that is
matched with known printer banding frequencies stored in a database. This allows the make and model
of the printer, which produced that document, to be identified. Although specific printers cannot be
currently identified, initial results show that banding frequencies are stable enough to use as an intrinsic
signature to determine a printer’s model and manufacturer.
While banding frequencies are easy to determine in documents displaying large mid-tone regions, they
are hard to detect from text. In [3], a technique using image texture analysis is described by Delp et al
to identify a printer from small regions of a document such as individual text characters. The
imperfections in a printer, causing fluctuations in the amount of toner transferred to the document, are 
modelled as a texture, providing a set of unique features for identification purposes. First, a document
is scanned before all the letter ‘e’s are extracted, ‘e’ being the most common character in the English
language. Using analysis tools, a set of unique features is extracted from each character to form feature
vectors for each ‘e’. These feature vectors are classified individually by comparing them to 5000
known feature vectors, with majority voting deciding the final classification. This technique
successfully classified 9 out of the 10 printer models tested, but as in [4], will only determine a
printer’s make and model. Also, it is restricted to text from a laser printer and does not encompass
documents containing colour and/or images nor does it classify documents produced on inkjet printers.
In [5], Delp et al extend their work in [3] by using varied font size, font type, paper type and printer
age; and the effects these variables have on printer identification. A document is scanned and a set of 
features extracted from each character ‘e’ as with the technique previously described. These sets of 
features form feature vectors which are individually classified using a modified classification method
employing a support vector machine (SVM) as described in [7]. Using an SVM provides better
generalization and was able to correctly classify all 10 of the test printers by make and model when
variables such as font size and type were the same in both the document and the comparison data.
When document and comparison data variables differ, printer identification is not 100% correct. For
example, when there is a difference of 2 points between fonts, correct identification is 90% while an 8-
point difference yields only a 40% success rate. Further work is currently being carried out to improve
printer identification results when taking into account different fonts, paper types and printer age.
Work carried out by Deng et al [8], investigates the identification of laser printers based on matching
printed character shapes. Due to print overspray, character edge raggedness, toner density, etc., a single 
character can have a different ‘shape’ when produced by different printers. The identification technique
involves three distinct steps; image acquisition, image pre-processing and character matching. Image
acquisition uses specialist equipment to obtain microscopic images of characters contained within a 
document. Pre-processing involves various techniques such as extracting certain characters, removing
‘noise’ and obtaining binary images. These normalized characters are then matched with characters
from documents of known origin, held within a database. This matching technique uses distance
transform [9], a method widely used in pattern recognition and image matching. The algorithm used is
able to determine the closest matching printer or printers to that which created the suspect document
even from a group of same make and model printers. Initial results give an identification accuracy of
25% when selecting a single candidate printer and 82% when selecting a set of five candidate printers.
Further work is being carried out to extract
further intrinsic printer features thereby
improving the identification accuracy.
Figure 2: Vertical lines printed by Canon, Epson
and HP printers
Similar work is done by Oliver et al [10] who
use an ImageXpert print quality analyzer [11] 
to obtain unique signatures, which may be
used for printer identification. Test patterns
are generated by printers using various
‘impact’ and ‘non-impact’ technologies
including ink jet and laser printing. These test
patterns, made up of text, lines and dots, are
evaluated using the ImageXpert analyser to 
determine various print metrics such as
$!
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character raggedness, over-spray, dot roundness and satellite drops. Satellite drops are seen under
magnification and can be considered to be small drops of ink deposited on the page outside the
perimeter of a printed character. An illustrated example (fig. 2) shows the differences between three ink
jet printers from three different manufacturers, Canon, Epson and HP. On analysing printed vertical
lines the Canon printer displays noticeable raggedness on the right side of the line, while the HP
printers shows a degree of overspray on the left hand side. The Epson printer shows neither of these
traits. By comparing such derived metrics against those of known print patterns, the type and make of 
printer can be established. From the careful selection of appropriate metrics and print features, further
work sees the possibility of differentiating between individual printers of the same make and model.
Complementary analysis of the effects in paper, ink and toner choices will also be made.
In [12], Kee et al create printer profiles by modelling the geometric degradation in a document caused 
by printing. This technique allows both the linking of a document to a printer and the detection of
document inconsistencies for authentication purposes. The construction of a printer profile and the 
subsequent printer identification is carried out via three distinct steps. First a document is digitally
scanned from which all matching characters are located, for example, all the letter ‘a’s. Once all the 
characters are correctly aligned and processed, the second step is to construct a printer profile using a
principal components analysis (PCA) [13] thus providing a model capturing complex degradations in
the print. The third and final step is to use the printer profile for printer identification by matching it
with profiles of known printers. Ten printers were tested, each producing documents containing 22,400
characters all of which were processed to create the required profile. For each of the ten documents
created, identification of its original printer was near perfect even between printers of the same make
and model. However, these results are only achievable by creating profiles for differing toner levels.
Future work seeks to remove this toner level dependency and make the identification technique more
sensitive for the same make and model of printer.
Many additional studies have been more recently undertaken (e.g. [14-17]), using similar techniques as 
those previously described and yielding comparable results.
2.2 Active techniques 
Active techniques explicitly embed hidden information into a document allowing that document to be
matched with its printer. This information may be covert data unique to a document’s printer or it may
be the introduction of deliberate yet known imperfections into the document’s text and/or images.
Unlike passive techniques, the suspect printer typically does not need to be in possession of the
investigators for a match to be made. Purchasers may provide their details when buying a printer or
when registering a printer with the manufacturer for warranty purposes. Such a process will typically
tie an individual printer to its owner. Therefore if a document contains information unique to an
individual printer, that printer can be traced to its owner via the information held by the printer
manufacturer. Because a printer will embed unique information into the documents it produces, the 
accuracy rate for printer identification is significantly higher than the current passive techniques
previously described. For active techniques to be wholly effective, the embedding of data and its
subsequent use must be kept secret while the hidden data itself remains undetectable to the naked eye. 
In [25] and [26], Delp et al explore the use of the print quality defect ‘banding’ [4] to introduce an 
extrinsic signature into a document. In previously described passive techniques, implicit banding
frequencies (fig. 1) are compared with known printer profiles to match document to printer. With the 
active method, printer unique banding is purposely introduced into the document allowing that
document to be easily matched with its individual printer. The extrinsic signature is embedded into the
document by modulating the printing process, notably the laser exposure, which in turn generates the
banding signals on the printed page. By varying the modulation, artificial banding of different
frequencies can be introduced into a document’s text and images without perceptual degradation of
print quality. To be effective, this technique requires the printer hardware to be modified, particularly
the print mechanism, which will potentially prevent any attempts to modify the hidden data before it is
printed. To detect the extrinsic signature and match it to a printer, the tools developed for passive
printer identification are used. Initial results show minimal reduction in print quality although due to 
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limitations imposed by the main printing drum, banding frequencies no higher than 50 cycles or 
‘bands’ per inch have been achieved. Future work aims to increase banding frequencies to over 100
cycles per inch thus providing a document with no visible decline in print quality and rendering the
embedded information undetectable to the naked eye.
Gaubatz et al [27] propose a quality assurance (QA) system associated with printed security markings
for performing printer identification. The use of colour tiles (fig. 3) was proposed in a previous work
[28] as a security mechanism to deter counterfeiting and aid in document authentication. Here these
tiny colour tile deterrents are added to a document and utilised to implement document and printer
matching. A unique identifier is encoded in a printed tile by setting each of its 56 sub-regions to one of 
six different colour combinations. Device authentication is achieved when a candidate device is
capable of decoding the unique identifier. A 10-feature vector is formed
from the printed tile using various metrics used to predict the outcome
of the authorisation procedure. When identifying the document’s
printer, a classifier is used to compare the features of a printed tile’s 
feature vector with digital representations of the original deterrent
produced by suspected printers.  This technique lends itself to both
active and passive techniques; active by explicitly embedding data into
a document and passive by matching the printed result with profiles of
known printers. Preliminary testing has produced results which yield
printer detection accuracy comparable to other approaches suggesting 
that precise identification is possible. Future work will investigate
further algorithmic classification methods to improve printer
identification accuracy.
Figure 3: Colour tile
security deterrents
Unknown to many printer users, an active technique of printer
identification has been in use since the 1980’s. Printers from several of
the main printer manufactures explicitly encode tracking data into
every document that is created [19]. Found in documents from colour
laser printers and photocopiers, this data takes the form of microscopic
yellow dots repeated across the entire page and arranged within a grid.
This makes it impossible to circumvent the system by printing in just a 
small area of a document or by attempting to cut away certain sections. 
The grid is capable of encoding up to 14 seven-bit bytes of tracking
information, presented in rows and columns of dots. The millimetre
sized yellow dots (fig. 4) appear approximately every inch within a
document and are situated amongst the printed text and images. Yellow
is chosen for the dots as this makes them invisible to the naked eye 
when printed on a white background.
Figure 4: Tracking dots 
The dots are arranged to form codes or tracking data whose make-up can differ between printer
manufacturers. Several companies reportedly encode the serial number of the printer, the date and time 
of the printing together with other such data. Canon, which fit the tracking mechanism to all their
colour laser printers, encodes the country and dealer the printer was delivered to, within a unique
number added secretly to each page [18]. The dots themselves are embedded into the document at
approximately 20 billionths of a second before printing, by means of a computer chip located near the 
print mechanism. Viewing such embedded dots can be done by shining a blue LED torch on to the
document which must be inspected closely through a magnifying glass. It can be imagined that the
embedded tracking data is decoded using secret and proprietary algorithms known only to the printer
manufactures and other associated parties.
This printer identification technology was first developed 25 years ago by Xerox to allay the fears that
coloured printers would be used to produce counterfeit currency. It is reported in [19] and [20] that the
US government were party to this technology development and now use it as standard practice in
criminal cases involving printed documents to trace the printer used and ultimately the wanted 
perpetrators. However, the addition of traceable data in potentially every document that is printed
raises a number of privacy concerns as discussed in section 3.
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!
3. Privacy Implications 
The 2004 report by PC World magazine [20], together with further investigation by the Electronic
Frontier Foundation (EFF) [21] brought to light the fact that embedding tracking data into printed
documents was taking place in the US. Printer manufactures, on the request of the US government,
commonly fit laser colour printers with devices that embed arrangements of yellow dots into all
documents (see section 2.2). The US secret service then use this covert data, with the aid of the printer
manufactures, to trace counterfeiters and other felons by the documents they produce during their 
criminal activities.
This practice between the US secret service and the printer manufactures has been in operation since
the 1980’s. However, reports suggest that this technology is used outside the US and is employed by
other governments (e.g. [18]). Described as a counterfeit deterrence, the US government stress that the
identification and tracking of printers is done on a case by case basis and is used only for suspected
documents as part of a criminal investigation [20]. It is unclear who generates the embedded tracking
codes and who can decipher them, be it the printer manufacturers, the creators of the coding ‘chips’,
the US government or a combination of these. A scenario can be imagined where the make and serial
number is obtained from a document and the corresponding printer company contacted who hold
information relating to the printer’s purchaser. Typically, electrical retailers retain purchaser
information during a sale or via customers taking up warranty offers. Certain countries, for example
China, keep a tight rein on the ownership and purchasing of electrical equipment such as printers, so
recording information on every customer is done as standard. A printer company will typically
maintain all customer information within a database whose content could be made available to
government agencies upon request.
The US government state they only use the document tracking information to investigate criminal acts, 
but is this truly the case? Currently no law or statute exists in the US preventing the government from
using this technology for other purposes, nor are there any laws to say what documents can or cannot
be traced. This leaves a situation where the government cannot be made to adhere to the technology’s
proper purpose or verify that no other use is taking place. In the current political climate it is not hard
to imagine the US government using it for other purposes. One unanswered question is how many
countries are employing this printer identification process? With reports emerging about its use in the
US and Holland, the answer is likely to be many.
Those within the printer industry have known about the embedding of data into documents for years
but have not had to notify customers of this feature. Therefore, despite some reports appearing in major
publications, for example The New York Times [22], the use of this technology remains largely
unknown to the public. Those that are aware are left with no choice in whether the data is added or not,
as the feature cannot be disabled without the likelihood of breaking the printer. This tracking
technology is not just aimed at those with expensive, ‘state of the art’ colour laser printers as it is 
appearing in printers of all price and quality brackets. For those printers who have been identified not
to embed the yellow tracking dots [23], it is possible that some other kind of tracking information is
included in a way as yet undiscovered. Its age and relative simplicity could indicate that it has been
replaced by a more sophisticated system especially now the current coding system has been revealed.
The implementation of this tracking technology has been carried out with virtually no public awareness
much less public discussion of the privacy and anonymity risks to printer users. It must be realised that
through their use these secret codes could potentially track any document back to the person or 
business that printed it. Embedding hidden information into a document without knowledge or consent
means an act presumed private could easily become public. Does this mean people can no longer
conduct their private life or discussions as they otherwise would? Is the use of such technology an 
abuse of people’s entitlement to protect personal data? In fact isn’t this practice a blatant violation of 
human rights?
Printed documents have become an important tool for free speech with anonymous self publication and
distribution of such material remaining a vital political communication channel in many countries.
With the right to speak anonymously being threatened, long protected forms of expression could be in
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danger. People, who print political pamphlets, membership lists and organize legal protests for
example, could be in danger of being traced. Whistleblowers, dissidents and journalists amongst others
could be at risk when printing documents especially when doing so in more oppressive states. With no
laws in place there is nothing to stop privacy violations by governments and other organisations that 
have access to this printer identification technology. A government needs to follow no legal process to
obtain and use any embedded document data, nor must they inform members of the public they are 
being ‘spied’ upon. What is to stop a government to share any information they gather with other states 
to help identify speakers? Is tracking information really used for tracking alone or is it also used as a
form of surveillance? And what other deals have been done between governments and technology
manufactures regarding secret tracking devices?
The practice of embedding hidden data into documents is reportedly for the tracking of criminals. But
what is to stop criminals, who gain access to this technology, using it to their own advantage?
Criminals could potentially trace and verify the owner of stolen and potentially embarrassing
documents, and use that knowledge for blackmail purposes. Advocates against this technology (e.g.
[24]) wish that documents were less traceable and users had better options to achieve anonymity.
Although it would not guarantee absolute anonymity, as other methods are available (e.g. passive
identification techniques), these campaigners would like to see a ban on traceable printers.
4. Potential drawbacks 
In its current guise the notion of printer identification appears to present a number of shortcomings.
Passive techniques identify and use the unique characteristics of a document to match it with a printer.
These characteristics are typically imperfections in the document’s text and images produced by tiny
flaws in the printer’s components. The current research in this area, as previously described, is far from
accurate. The existing techniques require the printer to be in possession of the authorities for testing 
purposes or a profile of that printer to be held in a database. This would suggest a profile must be
constructed and stored for every printer currently in existence for this identification technique to be 
wholly effective. If a printer profile is not held then a printer will be selected that is the closest match,
in other words, the wrong printer. This technology is able to successfully determine between printer
types (e.g. laser, inkjet) and between printers makes and models but cannot currently differentiate
between printers of the same model. Factors such as different fonts, paper and print cartridge levels,
which can affect the level of printer identification accuracy are being investigated. Passive techniques
yield promising results but are by no means as accurate as the active process of explicitly hiding data
within a document.
Active techniques purposely embed traceable information into a document, be it imperfections in text 
or images, or microscopic tracking dots encoding the printer’s serial number. These tracking dots are 
yellow in colour printed against a white background, making them appear invisible to the naked eye.
However, this technique is reportedly only used with colour laser printer which limits its application
dramatically. A large number of documents do not require colour and may be printed using a
‘greyscale’ facility. Furthermore, what is the percentage of documents printed on laser printers when
cheaper alternatives are available, especially in the home? And what are the effects of using different
coloured paper? Do the dots then become visible?
The idea of embedding hidden information into a document brings a number of potential avoidance
mechanisms. It must be remembered that “baddies in security are arbitrarily smart” (Yan, 2010) and are
likely to sidestep document tracking technology, especially now that increasing reports are emerging. A
criminal may be an organisation ‘insider’ and use company printers or they may use publicly available
printers in libraries and the like. With multiple users accessing a printer the possibility of tying 
individuals to particular documents is practically zero. Some organisations may require users to enter a
password into a printer before its use, but this practice can be easily bypassed. A criminal could print
the documents they require before discarding the printer, or steal a printer just for the purpose of 
creating those same documents. Furthermore, the criminal could simply avoid using a printer known to
include printer identification technology, as listing in readily available reports (e.g. 23). Another
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approach could be to somehow add yellow dots of their own to a document thus rendering the genuine
tracking dots, and the information they encode, useless.
One method described for tracing the owner of a suspect printer is from information held on the owner
by the printer manufacturer. This information is typically gained from product registrations. But how
many people actually register a product they buy? Certainly not a criminal. Many states do not enforce
compulsory product registration but even if they did, a purchaser could quite easily supply bogus
information.
5. Conclusion
The basic premise of printer identification is to allow law enforcement agencies to trace the origins of 
fraudulent and/or incriminating documents held as part of a criminal investigation. Tracing a 
document’s printer will ultimately lead to the printer’s owner and potentially the criminal(s) being
sought.
Two methods of printer identification have been described, passive and active, and the research being
undertaken in these areas. The revelation that an active technique of embedding traceable information
into documents within the US has also been discussed together with the privacy concerns this brings. 
The embedded information takes the form of microscopic yellow tracking dots which encode the
printer’s serial number, printing timestamp and such amongst the text and images of a document. This
practice has reportedly been adopted for years by US government agencies without any legal
precedents and may potentially be taking place in many other countries.
The concept of tracing criminals via documents and the printers that create those documents has its 
merits. But as previously discussed, printer identification in its current guise is not perfect and brings
many potential shortcomings particularly with the issue of privacy. If government agencies are going to
use (or keep using?) such technology they must do so with the aim of preventing counterfeiting etc. 
while protecting privacy at the same time. They need a way to track criminals without compromising
the anonymity of every single document that is printed.
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